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The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional
Institutions, Social Change, and
Same-Sex Marriage

AMYL. WAX*

1. INTRODUCTION

What is the meaning of marriage? The political fault lines that have
emerged in the last election on the question of same-sex marriage
suggest that there is no consensus on this issue. This article looks at the
meaning of marriage against the backdrop of the same-sex marriage
debate. Its focus is on the opposition to same-sex marriage. Drawing on
the work of some leading conservative thinkers, it investigates whether a
coherent, secular case can be made against the legalization of same-sex
marriage and whether that case reflects how opponents of same-sex
marriage think about the issue. In examining these questions, the miicle
seeks more broadly to achieve a deeper understanding of the place of
marriage in social life and to explore the implications of the recent
controversy surrounding its refonn.

*

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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One striking aspect of the debate over the legal status of gay relationships
is the contrast between public opinion, which is sharply divided, and
what is written about the issue, which is more one-sided. A prominent
legal journalist stated to me recently, with grave certainty, that there
exists not a single respectable argument against the legal recognition of
gay marriage. The opponents' position is, in her word, a "nonstarter."
That viewpoint is reflected in discussions of the issue that appear in the
academic literature. One searches long and hard for a piece in law or
social policy that rejects, or even makes a serious effort to formulate the
case against, the official recognition of gay marriage and gay adoption. I
Matters are not very different in journals of opinion that appeal to the
educated public. 2 If the published materials reflect the views of the
1. See Rutgers University, Same-Sex Marriage: A Selective Bibliography of the
Legal Literature, http://law-library.rutgers.edu/SSM.html (2002) (listing numerous
articles overwhelmingly favoring legalization). See Mark Spindelmn, Equality, Privacy
and Lesbian and Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057 (2004), for
recent, mostly pro-reform work by legal scholars on gay rights and same-sex marriage.
Articles in the literature that take a different view include, for example, MARRIAGE AND
SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003) (presenting arguments
against legalizing same-sex marriage); Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our
Final Answer? 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 729 (2000) (contesting the
"neutrality" and "equality" arguments in favor of same-sex marriage); John Finnis, The
Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and
Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. OF JURIS. 97 (1997) (drawing on Thomian,
Aristotelian, Platonic, and other traditional philosophies to argue that homosexuals do
not have a fundamental right to marry and that limiting marriage to heterosexual unions
has a basis in reason); Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of
Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REv. 773 (2002) (arguing that same-sex marriage will weaken
norms that channel people into heterosexual unions, which will undermine the wellbeing of children); Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall ofthe Case Against SameSex Marriage, ST. THOMAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (draft on file with author)
(reviewing conservative positions on same-sex marriage); Patrick Lee & Robert P.
George, What Sex Can Be: SelfAlienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. OF
JURIS. 135, 135 (1997) (arguing that homosexual sex acts are "incapable of actualizing
true marital union" and that the law ought not treat such acts like heterosexual marital
sex acts); Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage
in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 771
(2001) (arguing that heterosexual marriage deserves special legal status because the
"committed relationship of a man and woman to each other and to the family they create is
unparalleled"); Lee Harris, The Future of Tradition, POL'y REV., June-July 2005, at 3-31
(developing a conservative defense of tradition to argue against same-sex marriage). See
also JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT Is GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (arguing that gay marriage would be good for
American society because it would increase respect for the institution of marriage itself);
Peter Berkowitz, The Court, The Consitution, and the Culture of Freedom, POL'y REV.,
Aug.-Sept. 2005, at 19-24 (discussing the conservative perspective on gay marriage).
2. A typical example is THE NEW REpUBLIC, which has long championed samesex marriage. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative)
Case for Gay Marriage, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20 (offering several
conservative arguments for gay marriage such as that gay marriage would increase the
number of happy, stable families).
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educated elite-what Margaret Thatcher used to call "the chattering
classes"-then this group staunchly favors extending marriage to
same-sex couples, and the sooner the better. The commentary reveals
general agreement that this reform is entirely in keeping with the
institution's character and purpose. Alternatively, because marriage is
flawed anyway, there is no compelling reason to preserve it in its current
form or to resist changes that some people desire or perceive better to
serve their individual needs. 3 Few, if any, doubts are expressed that
permitting gay marriage is an unalloyed good.
Yet, the election results show that most ordinary people beg to differ
with my journalist friend and her COhOli. Initiatives to block same-sex
marriage passed in every state in which they were on the ballot this
November, indicating that majorities disfavor legalization. 4 These
developments suggest that our society is sharply divided in its
understanding of marriage in particular and, perhaps, traditional social
institutions in general. What is the significance of these votes and what
attitudes do they reveal? Do many people find the idea of same-sex
marriage to be fundamentally at odds with their concept of the
institution? Is this stance just a matter of unexamined feelings, raw
prejudice, or reactive hostility? Are the politics to be explained by
animus alone? Some of the opposition undeniably stems from religious
convictions that are unlikely to hold much water with those who fail to

3. Critiques of marriage are commonplace in feminist legal scholarship. See, e.g.,
Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129 (2003).
See also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). But cf William C. Duncan, The
Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non-Marital Cohabitation, 82 OR. L.
REv. 1001 (2003).
4. See Lynn D. Wardle, MQlTiage, Relationships, Same-Sex Unions, and the Right of
Intimate Association, in MARR.rAGE AND SAME SEX UNIO s: A DEBATE 190 (Lynn D. Wardle et
al. eds., 2003) ("[A]dvocates of legalizing same-sex maniage have lost, and lost convincingly,
whenever the people have been allowed to vote on the issue .... [Votes ranged] from 61 percent
to 70 percent against legalizing same-sex marriage."); Ramesh Ponnuru, Option Four: A
Compromise on Gay MQlTiage, NAT'L REv., June 6, 2005, at 38, 39 (,,[VJoters supported
initiatives against same-sex marriage in every state where they were on the ballot."). According
to a recent report from the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, public opinion runs
strongly against recognizing gay mmTiage. See THE PEW RESEARCH CE1\JTER, BEYOND RED VS.
BLUE: REpUBLICANS DIVIDED ABOUT ROLE OF GOVERNMENT-DEMOCRATS BY SOCIAL AND
PERSONAL VALUES 35 (2005), ht1:p://people-press.org/reports/pd£!242.pdf ("Americm1s continue
to decisively reject gay marriage. Americans oppose gay marriage by nearly two-to-one
(61 %-32%), a margin that has remained stable since the middle of2003.").
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share the relevant beliefs. 5 The more interesting question is how much
of the opposition is informed by non-religious considerations. What are
those non-faith-based grounds, and do they amount to a cogent case?
Although the majority's position receives relatively little explication
in the academic literature on family law reform, it is not entirely without
support from intellectuals. Educated conservative opinion leaders do not
write much for an academic audience. 6 Rather, the opposition to gay
marriage is voiced most vigorously in a handful of right-wing journals of
opinion. 7 The approach to the subject is something of a grab bag, lacking
sustained and systematic exposition. 8 Some pieces make strong appeals
5. Several sources illustrate the role of religious convIctIons and religiouslybased moral principles in policy debates. See CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002) (arguing that citizens may responsibly base
their political stances on religious beliefs, even if the only reasons for those
commitments are religious in nature); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIE CES AND
PUBLIC REASONS (1995) (examining American history and culture to search for
principles that will help Americans decide to what extent private convictions, including
religion, should be employed to make and defend political choices); KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIO S AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) (arguing that American citizens
should not be expected to rely exclusively on rational, secular grounds for their political
decisions); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
(1990) (arguing that viewing various moral theories in terms of a single "egalitarian
plateau" can help to clarify disputes over the meaning of concepts such as rights,
freedom, the common good, and justice).
6. See Daniel Klein & Andrew Western, How Many Democrats per Republican
at UC-Berkeley and Stanford? ACADEMIC QUESTIONS (forthcoming 2005), cited in Karl
Zinsmeister, Diversity on Campus? There is None, AM. ENTER., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 43-45;
Daniel Klein & Charlotta Stem, How Politically Diverse Are the Social Sciences and
Humanities? ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, (forthcoming 2005) cited in Karl Zinsmeister, id.;
see also John O. McGinnis & Matthew Schwartz, Conservatives Need Not Apply, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 1,2003, at A14 (using campaign contributions to document that 74% of law
professors donate to Democrats, while 16% donate to Republicans); Adam Liptak,
Giving the Law a Religious Perspective, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at A16 (noting
that, according to forthcoming McGinnis study, 80% of law professors at the top 21 law
schools made campaign contributions that primarily supported Democrats, while 15%
primarily supported Republicans).
7. See Stanley Kurtz, Going Dutch? Lessons ofthe Same-Sex Marriage Debate in the
Netherlands, THE WKLY. STANDARD, May 31, 2004, at 21 [hereinafter Kurtz, Going Dutch?];
Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage: The Road to Polyamory, THE WKLY. STANDARD,
August 4, 2003, at 26. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. et aI., Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian
Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2004 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP art. 4, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4 (questioning Kurtz's data and
arguments); Susan M. Shell, The Liberal Case Against Gay Marriage, THE PUB. INT.,
Summer 2004, at 3; Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and Fight: Don't Take Gay Man-iage Lying
Down, NAT'L REV., July 28, 2003, at 26; Midge Deeter, An Amazing Pass, NAT'L REv., Nov.
8, 2004, at 30; Maggie Gallagher, Massachusetts vs. Marriage: How to Save an Institution,
WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 1,2003, at 21; Robert P. George & David L. Tubbs, The Future of
Marriage: Injudicious Consequences of a Kerry Vote, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, November 1,
2004,
http://www.nationaireview.com/commentlgeorge_tubbs200411 0 10830.asp;
Justin
Raimondo, A Gay Man Decries 'Gay Rights, ' AM. ENTER., Mar. 2000, at 44.
8. But see JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD
FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (attempting to formulate and counter
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to tradition, past practice, and customary understandings, with little
analysis of why these elements should receive deference. Others take an
approach more consonant with "value-free" social science, relying on
studies that purport to predict dire changes in individual or collective
behavior that, it is claimed, will erode marriage's ability to perform its
traditional functions. It is sometimes acknowledged that those predictions
are necessarily just that-pronouncements that cannot help but speculate
on the unknown, because the dreaded event and its aftermath have not
yet occurred.
Despite the occasional forays into social science
methodology, much of the writing that opposes gay marriage adopts the
tone of a beleaguered minority at pains to establish distance from the
views of the abhorrent "liberal" elites. "Liberal" positions regarding family,
sexuality, and the government's role in these areas are routinely disdained
as alien, threatening, partial, sophistic, and dangerous to the social order.
Unfortunately, these critiques are often superficial and freighted with
unstated or unsupported assumptions. The contemporary opposition to
gay marriage is the quintessential incompletely theorized agreement.
The case law concerning rights of homosexuals and legal recognition
of gay marriage likewise fails to set out a systematically principled
position or to develop a sustained line of argument. In Lawrence v. Texas,9
in which the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing
same-sex sodomy, Justice Scalia in dissent raises the specter of same-sex
marriage without explaining why the government should refuse to
permit it. Rather, he stresses the unpopularity of the Court's position,
accusing it of "tak[ing] sides in the culture war" and of failing to
acknowledge that "[m]any Americans do not want persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or
as boarders in their home."lO He observes that these citizens see holding
homosexuals at a distance as necessary to "protect[] themselves and their
families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and
destructive."]] Noting that the Comi views excluding homosexuals "as
'discrimination' which it is the function of our judgments to deter,"
Scalia accuses the Court of being "imbued ... with the law profession's
the conservative position against gay marriage point by point). See discussion of Rauch
infra text accompanying notes 99-108.
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. ld. at 602.
11. ld.
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anti-anti-homosexual culture," and with being "seemingly unaware that
the attitudes of that culture are not obviously 'mainstream. ,,,12 In
conclusion, Scalia warns that the Court's result and reasoning will
inevitably lead to recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the
federal Constitution. But apart from noting the unpopularity of this
move, Scalia says little about why this would be such a bad thing.
The few decisions that, in the wake of Lawrence, grapple with the
federal constitutional status of state recognition of homosexual family
relationships such as same-sex marriage and adoption contain narrow,
lawyerly discussions that stick closely to the legal script for analyzing
claims under equal protection or fundamental rights jurisprudence and
avoid broad theoretical issues. Nonetheless, the rationale for refusing to
recognize same-sex unions or to establish other familial rights comparable
to those accorded heterosexuals receives somewhat more explication
than in Scalia's dissent. For example, in In re Kandu, a federal
bankruptcy court rejected a Canadian couple's challenge to the federal
Defense of Marriage Act's ban on acknowledging same-sex marriage in
federal law. The court justified the rule of marital exclusivity as based on
the government's interest in promoting the establishment of man-woman
unions as the ideal setting for procreation and emphasized that same-sex
couples are incapable of having shared biological children. In Lofton v.
Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, an Eleventh
Circuit decision upholding Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, the
court asserted that the state is entitled to assume that heterosexual
couples are generally better equipped to raise children with a healthy
gender identity.13 Both opinions, however, avoid reliance on the goals of
promoting traditional morality-goals that are specifically cited in the
prologues of both statutes under consideration. Rather, the courts take a
more functional view of the state's interest in holding the line against
same-sex unions or homosexual adoption.
Both rely on the
reasonableness of the assumption that shared biological parenting is
superior to alternatives. 14 In contrast, Scalia's opinion in Lawrence gives
12. Id. at 602-03.
13. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (ruling that the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act did not deny a fundamental right, and did not violate equal
protection); Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (trial court
holding that a Florida law barring adoption by homosexuals does not violate substantive
due process or equal protection under the appropriate standard of rational basis scrutiny),
aff'd, Lofton v. Sec'y of Fla. Dept. of Children and Families, 358 F.3d 804 (lith Cir.
2004).
14. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, 1., dissenting)
(arguing that "marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent
that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union. Thus
the refusal of the state to authorize same sex marriage results from such impossibility of
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a nod to traditional morality, affilIDs the state's right to promote it, and
stresses that the Court's reluctance to advance that goal is out of the
"mainstream."15
In sum, current commentary and legal materials fail to provide
anything like a unified, systematic exposition of the anti-gay marriage
position. This paper represents a halting attempt to develop such an
exposition by looking to thinkers identified with conservative
approaches to politics and social life. Burke, Oakeshott, and Hayek
are political philosophers centrally concerned with the problem of social
innovation and change. Drawing primarily on the work of Edmund Burke
and Michael Oakeshott,16 and using original sources and commentaries,
reproduction rather than from an invidious discrimination 'on account of sex. "');
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 30-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to state maniage law because "[e]ven accepting ... many same-sex
couples are successfully raising children in today's society, these couples are not at 'risk'
of having random and unexpected children by virtue of their ordinary sexual activities.
[Granting] civil man'iage to same-sex couples would not further the State's interest in
'responsible procreation' by opposite-sex couples."); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 976-77 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting) (noting that the right to
enter into a same-sex marriage is not historically fundamental); id. at 979 (Sossman, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Legislature need only have some rational basis for concluding that, at
present, those alternate family structures have not yet been conclusively shown to be the
equivalent of the marital family structure that has established itself as a successful one
over a period of centuries."); id. (Sossman, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding our belief
that gender and sexual orientation of parents should not matter to the success of the child
rearing venture, studies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences
between children raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex
couples.").
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In his reliance on traditional morality,
Scalia goes where other judges fear to tread. See Suzanne Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas (Rutgers Law Sch.
Newark) Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 17, available at http://law.
bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/artI7; see also Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas:
Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as our Official National Philosophy and
Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2004); Ronald
Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual Sodomy Issue: The
Journey from Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV., 42-47 (2004) (reviewing the
question of whether traditional morality can be invoked to justify laws regulating
homosexual conduct).
16. The third thinker associated with conservative social thought, Frederick
Hayek, is less apposite here. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(I 944). Hayek stresses the infirmities of human intellect in the economic realm. For
Hayek, utopian economic and social schemes are likely to go awry because individual
minds cannot possibly process all the information needed to run an economy efficiently.
Rather, the free market, through its rules of distribution and trade, automatically
generates, transmits, and harnesses voluminous and complex information. A complete
understanding of the implications of that information is, by definition, beyond the reach
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this paper seeks to explore whether these theorists' ideas provide any
guidance on the vexed, contemporary question of whether marriage
should be officially modified to accommodate homosexual unions. Do
these thinkers' ideas shed light on the deep present divisions in the
understanding of the meaning of marriage as a social institution? Do
they tell us anything useful about how to approach the question of
whether to modify marriage or preserve it in its present fonn? Do they
suggest the methods we should use in analyzing the issue, or infOlm us
as to whether, when, and how "mainstream" views or other considerations
are to be factored into decisions regarding refonn? This paper addresses
these and like questions.

II. CONSERVATIVES ON SOCIAL REFORM: BURKE AND OAKESHOTT
Edmund Burke's work is centrally concemed with the role of established
institutions in social life. Russell Kirk, an important expositor of Burke,
asserts that Burke attempted to articulate a theory of "collective human
intellect." I 7 Humankind accumulates its experience over generations.
Traditional institutions and customary practices represent the embodiment
of wisdom gleaned from this common experience. These traditions are
presumptively good or, at the very least, useful. In Burke's view,
"[p]rovidence, acting through the medium of human trial and error, has
developed every hoary habit for some important purpose."18 A corollary
is that human reason and its creations are infinn and inadequate
substitutes for the traditional fonns that have evolved collectively over
time. Burke insists that if we ignore tradition, or "tinker impudently
with it ... man is left awfully afloat in a sea of emotions and ambitions,
with only the scanty stock of fonnal leaming and the puny resources of
individual reason to sustain him.,,19 No one person or group living for a
limited period in history can canvass all the possible challenges that an
institution may be called upon to meet. Nor can mere mortals accurately
predict all the consequences of any human plan. For this reason,
charting the course of collective action and social policy using "fOlmal
leaming" and "individual reason" is far more prone to error and
unintended consequences than the faithful adherence to the accumulated

of any person, planning committee, or sub-group. Although Hayek's focus is economic
planning, his critique shares common themes with Burke and Oakeshott and applies
more broadly to all types of social engineering schemes that seek to revamp longstanding social arrangements governing complex human relations.
17. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELLIOT 33 (6th ed.
1978)
18. Id. at 34.
19.
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wisdom of mankind embodied in customs, cultural traditions, and settled
practices.
Respect for the collective wisdom of custom and practice, and the
recognition that rational constructions are inadequate substitutes, are
themes that also run through the work of Michael Oakeshott. Like
Burke, Oakeshott stresses the limitations of the rational faculties-limits
that are both informational and analytic. He criticizes the modem,
rationalist conviction that institutions are best designed from first
principles. Rather, the rationalist project founders on the fundamentally
fallacious assumption that "what is made is better than what merely
growS.,,20 For Oakeshott, abstract principles cannot possibly substitute
for the complexity, suppleness, and flexibility of traditions of behavior.
For this reason, Oakeshott opposes the modernist tendency to bring "the
political, legal, and institutional inhelitance" before "the tribunal of
intellect," and to make reason the ultimate arbiter of policy and practice. 21
Relying too much on reason does violence to the nature of customary
practice, which resists the demands of perfect coherence. As Oakeshott
explains:
A tradition of behaviour is a tricky thing to get to know. Indeed, it may even
appear to be essentially unintelligible. . .. [I]t has no changeless centre to which
understanding can anchor itself; there is no sovereign purpose to be perceived or
invariable direction to be detected; there is no model to be copied, idea to be
realized, or rule to be followed. 22

Oakeshott's remarks about the nature of social practice reveal that his
concern is as much with moral psychology and the roots of virtuous
action as with the inherent limits on human understanding. He draws a
sharp distinction between "reflective morality"-or the morality "of the
self-conscious pursuit of moral ideals"-and customary morality or the
morality of a habit of behavior. 23 Oakeshott identifies the former with
20. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The New Bentham, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 139 (Liberty Press new & expanded ed. 1991).
21. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS
AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 8. See generally PAUL FRANCO, MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT: AN INTRODUCTION 81-115 (2004) (outlining Oakeshott's critique of
rationalism); TERRY NARDIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT (2001)
(investigating Oakeshott's philosophy of knowledge, especially knowledge of purposeful
human conduct).
22. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Political Education, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 61.
23. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The Tower of Babel, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS A D
OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 472-77.
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the demand that "everything must be justified at the bar of human
reason.,,24 For Oakeshott, this demand is a formula for paralysis, both
for individuals and for societies. Sound action can only proceed from
giving the benefit of the doubt to existing precepts of morality, rather
than from continuously mulling over the rightness and consistency of
every decision in light of abstract principles. As with Burke, Oakeshott
is respectful of tradition and skeptical of critiques grounded in ideology
or a failure to achieve the "abstract and self-conscious coherence of a
morality of ideals.,,25 Nonetheless, Oakeshott is not dogmatically opposed
to reason in moral practice. Rather he defends "a mixed form of morality in
which reflection plays a vital, if subordinate role.,,26 He acknowledges
that reflection provides a basis for morality "to reform and to explain
itself' and to "propagate itself beyond the range of the custom of a
society.,,27 For Oakeshott, the ideological commitment to purging ideas
from the deliberative mix is suspect as yet another absolutist move that
enshrines dogma over practicality?8 Oakeshott famously said of Hayek's
staunch opposition to centralized economic planning that "[a] plan to
resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the
same styIe of politics. ,,29 He warns against giving abstractions, logic, or
intellectual analysis primacy and stands against "moral criticism
usurping the place of a habit of moral behaviour.,,30 His fear is that
"[t]he pursuit of perfection will get in the way of a stable and flexible
moral tradition, the naIve coherence of which will be prized less than the
unity which springs from selfconscious analysis and synthesis.,,31 What
is important is not to justify every practice, institution, and action to
one's own intellect, to iron out every inconsistency, and to square every
rule with analytic demands, but to shive to "apprehend the existence of a
subtle order in what appears to be chaotic."
This discussion reveals that mistrust of sole reliance on reasoned
analysis in designing social policies and institutions runs through the
work of the thinkers most closely associated with conservative social
FRANCO, supra note 21, at 96.
1d. at 88.
26. ld.
27. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, supra note 20, at 477.
28. See, e.g., FRANCO, supra note 21, at 85~87 (describing Oakeshott's disagreement
with some conservatives' unwavering connnitment to ideology).
29. OAKESHOTT, supra note 20, at 26; FRANCO, supra note 21, at 85 (citing same).
See also NARDIN, supra note 21, at 13; Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Conservative
Imagination: Michael Oakeshott, 44 AM. SCHOLAR 405, 413-14 (1975) (arguing that
Oakeshott disagreed sharply with conservatives who relied on principles or creeds like
natural law instead of adopting a "disposition" to "com[e] to be at home in this
connnonplace world.").
30. OAKESHOTT, supra note 20, at 477.
31. ld. at 478; FRANCO, supra note 21, at 88 (quoting same).
24.
25.
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thought. For Burke and Oakeshott, conceptual relationships have little
to do with how customs and traditions function in the real world.
Because the powers of human reason are severely limited, all but the
most intellectually gifted are incapable of engaging in sustained,
rigorous analysis or of thinking through problems without falling into
error. The dilemmas of human existence are particularly resistant to
rational analysis because social practices and traditions are not derived
from first principles, but evolve over time by trial and error. Human
action in society and politics operates not primarily through reasoning,
but through adherence to prescriptive roles, customs, and habits
continuously adjusted to the messy demands of day-to-day living. The
test of behavioral rules is thus whether they work well in the real world
as guides for human interaction rather than whether they conform
precisely to syllogistic demands. For this reason, institutions and
customs routinely admit of exceptions or variations that fit uneasily
within logical categories or fall short of treating seemingly like cases
alike. That a body of rules is not always rigorously coherent, however,
does not render it unsound as a foundation for the conduct of social life.
Although argument, analysis, and criticism of social practices are
given a subordinate role, Burke and Oakeshott do not categorically reject
them. Indeed, these thinkers' very identity as "social theorists" generates a
paradox. If moral and social life were a matter of habit, custom, and
traditional practice only, moral and political theory would reduce to
ethnography. There would be little basis for nonnative criticism of existing
traditions and little to say about social practices beyond cheerleading for
the status quo. Moreover, both Burke and Oakeshott acknowledge that
institutional change is an ineluctable part of social and economic life.
Traditions evolve and customs transform themselves. Neither thinker is
categorically opposed to change. Burke's commentators, for example,
have repeatedly noted Burke's acknowledgment that reform is inevitable
and that change, when properly guided, can be a source of renewal. 32
Oakeshott, likewise, recognizes that institutions are not static and that
modifications are sometimes in order. The attitude prescribed, however,
32. See, e.g., RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO
SANTAYANA 40 (arguing that Burke believed that change was inevitable, and that,
"properly guided, change is a process of renewal"); Don Herzog, Puzzling Through
Burke, 19 POL. THEORY 336, 344 (1991) ("Tradition here [in Burke's thinking] isn't the
enemy of change. . .. Political institutions require ongoing reform. .. [but change
should] take the form of scrutinizing existing problems and canvassing available
solutions, not trying to redesign things from scratch.").
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is one of mild resistance or cautious acquiescence rather than enthusiastic
embrace. "Looks good on paper" is never enough. Small, stepwise,
piecemeal alterations are always preferable to radical transformations,
however appealing such programs seem in theory.
The recognition that human customs, mores, and institutions evolve
over time gives rise to a normative puzzle. The transformation of
institutions does not happen blindly and automatically, wholly apart
from human will. Change can occur through the evolution of informal
social practice or through the enactment of legal reforms. Nonetheless,
these two mechanisms are distinct in the challenge they pose to the
Burkean paradigm. Although deliberation, conscious decision-making,
and rational choice are components for altering both the social and legal
landscape, shifts in customary practice are more likely to occur without
extensive deliberation or conscious theorizing. Although sometimes
debated among the people, changes on the ground occur spontaneously
when enough people come to accept them. Such developments conform
more closely to the evolutionary model in which new forms emerge
from the gradual accretion of individual decisions designed to deal with
the daily dilemmas of life. These developments are self-executing, because
popular support automatically brings them about.
In contrast, legal reforms must be deliberately and consciously
imposed. Under representative government, popular sentiment does not
automatically translate into new law. Rather, reforms can be refused
even in the teeth of popular sentiment or adopted by lawmakers without
popular support. Thus, lawmakers must exercise independent judgment
to decide which alternatives to impose from the top down. For this
reason, conservative thinkers cannot easily avoid developing a heuristic
to guide those with the power to advance or retard change. How should
lawmakers go about deciding which reforms to pursue and which to
resist?
According to Russell Kirk, Burke argues that change should only
"come as the consequence of a need generally felt, not inspired by
finespun abstractions.,,33 Moreover, that need deserves respect only when
felt by people with a reverence for tradition-people who themselves
lack enthusiasm for change. Politics are not to be entrusted to those who
cannot distinguish between idealistic innovations and arrangements,
however flawed, that have stood the test of time. Rather, for Burke:
Our part is to patch and polish the old order of things, trying to discern the
difference between a profound, slow, natural alteration and some infatuation of
the hour. . .. Human reason and speculation can assist in the adjustment of the
old order to new things if they are employed in a spirit of reverence, awake to

33.
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their own fallibility .... The perceptive reformer combines an ability to reform with
a disposition to preserve ... )4

Michael Freeman's commentary on Burke attempts further to explore
the question of what should be reformed and under what circumstances.
Once again, Freeman suggests that Burke is at pains to preserve the
fundamental principles and purposes of basic social institutions, which
must not be undermined by any deliberative plan. The periphery might
be altered, but the core should remain intact. Further, all "progress"
must be informed by the realization that perfectionism is a dangerous
ground for reform of any kind, because modifications based on "finespun abstractions" or reasoning about the flaws of prior arrangements
are themselves likely to be defective. One set of shortcomings will be
replaced by another, with unintended consequences that cannot be fully
anticipated until the reforms are in place. Freeman offers Burke's
statement of guidance to politicians:
But it is not human frailty and imperfection and even a considerable degree of
them, that becomes a ground for your alteration; for by no alteration will you
get rid of those errors, however you may delight yourselves in varying to
infinity the fashion of them. But the ground for a legislative alteration of a legal
Establishment is this, and this only; that you find the inclinations of the majority
of the people, concurring with your own sense of the intolerable nature of the
abuse, are in favour of change.3 5

James Conniff interprets Burke's remarks on reform as revealing the
conviction that a lawmaker should acquiesce in change only if both he
and the public concur that some modification is necessary.36 A simple
public clamor is not enough-the politician on the spot must convince
himself that refonn is in some sense unavoidable. Minor changes should
be resisted; it is only when the abuse is "intolerable" that change is
warranted.J7 This suggests that Burke is holding out for something akin
to the groundswell and perpetual agitation that builds when an institution
creates so many hardships and difficulties, or threatens so many
established values and priorities, that it becomes virtually unworkable.
That standard sets the bar very high: the engineers of change should wait
34.

ld.

35. MICHAEL FREEMAN, EDMUND BURKE AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL
RADICALISM 160 (1980) (quoting Edmund Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity
(February 6, 1772), in 7 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE (2005)).
36. See JAMES CONNIFF, THE USEFUL COBBLER: EDMUND BURKE AND THE POLITICS
OF PROGRESS 6-10, 68-70 (1994).

37.

ld.
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until settled practice is pushed to the breaking point. Anything short of
that argues for a holding pattern or, at most, slight tinkering on the
periphery of existing structures.
Michael Oakeshott likewise recognizes that traditions of behavior are
"never quite fixed nor finished .... ,,38 "[They possess] no changeless
centre to which understanding can anchor itself .... "39 It cannot be
denied that change does occur in institutions over time, although the
logic of change may be elusive and "some parts [of a practice] may
change more slowly than others....,,40 As with Burke, Oakeshott must
grapple with the normative implications of the observation that social
practices are not set in stone. From the positive recognition that existing
fonns do in fact transform themselves over time, Oakeshott must also
decide which reforms should be pursued and how political
decisionmakers should respond to pressure for change.
Like Burke, Oakeshott cautions against the enactment of reforms
whenever any flaws or inconsistencies are identified in existing
practices. Oakeshott comes out against what he terms the "politics of
felt need," which he characterizes as the relentless tendency to identify
problems or dissatisfactions with existing arrangements, however limited
in scope or effect, and then to pursue immediate action to correct the
perceived flaws. 4! He is suspicious of the quest for perfect coherence
and consistency in politics and law and disapproving of the insistence
that institutions conform perfectly to a "self-consistent creed" or
"universal nonn[s]" that admit of no exceptions. 42 Rather, he points out
that:
[Traditions] are not self-consistent; they often pull in different directions, they
compete with one another and cannot all be satisfied at the same time, and
therefore they cannot properly be thought of as a norm or a self-consistent set of
norms or "principles" capable of delivering to us an unequivocal message about
what we should do. 43

As commentator Paul Franco notes, Oakeshott's rejection of absolutism
grows out of his concept of tradition as a diverse "multi-voiced creature.,,44
This characterization suggests that political deliberation must always be
a messy, imprecise, ad hoc, pragmatic exercise, "a matter of striking a
38. OAKESHOTT, Reason and the Conduct of Political Life, in RATTOI ALISM fN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 26.
39. OAKESHOTT, Political Education, in RATIONALISM fN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 61.
40. Id.
41. FRANCO, supra note 21, at 83-84.
42. Id. at 96.
43. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics: A Reply to Professor Raphael, 13
POL. STUD. 90 (1965); FRA CO, supra note 21, at 96-97 (quoting same).
44. Oakeshott, supra note 43, at 90; FRANCO, supra note 21, at 97.
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balance between competing goods. ,,45 Oakeshott understood that "[p]ractical
reasoning is always a matter of attending to the multiplicity of
considerations that compose a tradition,,46 and finding some way to
reconcile them all. Although arguments over principle are not wholly
banished and play some role in the debate, the inquiry can never be
reduced to "a matter of mathematical demonstration issuing in
categorical injunctions.,,47 No set of abstract precepts can be allowed to
sweep everything in its path, especially when the objects of demolition
are long-standing practices that serve important social purposes and have
stood the test of time.
III. CONSERVATIVE IDEAS AND THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
Do these pronouncements offer help on the issue that confronts us
now, which is whether maniage should be reformed to allow same-sex
unions? This question has two potential aspects. First, is cunent voter
opposition to recognizing same-sex maniage motivated by similar
notions, or does it stem from some other source? Second, do these ideas
aid us in deciding, either as voters or lawmakers, to resist or embrace
this particular proposal for reform?
The answer to the first question is complicated by the role of religion
in the politics of same sex maniage, as well as by the place of religion in
contemporary conservative politics generally. Burke's and Oakeshott's
traditionalism is primarily secular and does not depend directly on
religious belief of any kind. But some portion of political opposition to
same-sex maniage is motivated by religious conviction. 48 Thus, whether
Burke's and Oakeshott's ideas are shared by most contemporary voters
may reflect in part the degree to which those voters' hostility to samesex maniage is grounded in religious belief. If faith-based convictions
are a major factor, the theorists' ideas may not matter much. On the
other hand, Burke's and Oakeshott's ideas square easily with a religious
outlook, and a religiously motivated opposition to same-sex maniage
does not rule out additional, secular rationales for conservative views.
Contemporary voters for whom religious convictions playa role might
45.

FRANCO, supra note 21, at 97.
Id. at 94.
47. Id. at 97.
48. See, e.g., Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage? (It's
the Gay Part), N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 19, 2005, at 34 (profiling anti-gay marriage
activists in Maryland, who overwhelmingly cite religious reasons for their opposition).

46.
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also endorse Burke's and Oakeshott's more general caution towards
institutional change.
On whether Burke and Oakeshott can help with the case against samesex marriage, the central dilemma is whether the conservative veneration
of tradition, coupled with a grudging willingness to allow tradition to
evolve, can yield a determinate position on this specific problem considered
in a contemporary setting. As Don Herzog points out, the formula that
exalts preservation but admits change is an abstraction that is hard to
apply in practice because it continuously flirts with a contradiction. 49 A
person who credits a positive reason to modify settled practice is
necessarily willing, in some sense, to jettison tradition. so The key
challenge is to determine when that willingness is justified.
On this point, it might help to ask how Burke and Oakeshott would
resolve the question of marital reform generally or would regard specific
past changes in marital practice. Marriage has not been a static institution,
with pronounced shifts in domestic law and custom occurring recently.
How would Burke and Oakeshott have assessed, contemporaneously,
the disappearance of the marriage bar in employment,Sl the enactment
of no-fault divorce, the virtual abolition of alimony, and the evolution
in the rules of child custody from paternal prerogative to "tender
years" maternal preference to joint custody? It is far from clear that
Burke and Oakeshott would have approved of any of these as they
occurred. That all eventually came to pass poses the distinct
question of how traditionalists should evaluate changes that are a fait
accompli, after they have been accommodated over time by myriad
transformations, subtle and dramatic, in behavior and social practices.
Although these are not easy questions to answer, conservatives may
regard them as of little relevance to the current project. Both Burke
and Oakeshott view customary practice as particular and are loathe to
see a sound position on one issue as necessarily prescribing the
propriety of others. From this perspective, attempts to generalize from
past marital reforms to the one under consideration is a futile exercise or,
at best, of limited usefulness. Rather, there is no reason to believe
that some unifying principle can answer all questions at once or that
on-the-ground practicalities surrounding one innovation will shed light
on the pros and cons of others. Reforms must be considered case by
case. Thus, although the past may sometimes enlighten us on a present
dilemma, it will not always help us. We will not necessarily learn much
49. Herzog, supra note 32, at 343-45.
50. Herzog, supra note 32, at 345.
51. See Tom Sheridan & Pat Stretton, Mandarins, Ministers, and the Bar on
Married Women, 46 J. OF INDUS. REL. 84, 84-101 (2004), on the debate surrounding the
marriage bar in Australia.
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about how to approach same-sex marriage from reviewing the story of
past institutional change.
Although the particularism of the conservative approach to social
change would appear to offer little hope of developing an all-purpose
heuristic for assessing specific reforms, it is nonetheless possible to
make some valid observations by contrasting these theorists' broader
ideas with contemporary advocacy of same-sex marriage. The views of
Burke and Oakeshott are sharply at odds with the proponents' approach
to modifying existing institutions and reforming traditional marriage.
For one, these thinkers' ideas arguably cannot be squared with using the
courts as a fOlUm for advancing the cause. Indeed, a pure countermajoritarian
move in the name of abstract principles-of the type our courts make
under the banner of judicial review of legislative enactments-would
appear antithetical to their understanding of how institutional change
should occur. Kirk's suggestion that Burke seems to countenance reform
when the need for change is felt by people with a reverence for tradition
seems to suggest that something close to majority sentiment is a vital
prerequisite for legal change. Majority support, or more, is a necessary,
although not always a sufficient, condition. 52 This, in turn, implies that
highly unpopular reforms pushed through under the principle of absolute
rights for individuals and subgroups are suspect unless most people
already recognize those rights as valid. Burke and Oakeshott would thus
appear to be deeply suspicious of a robust set of countermajoritarian
powers or prerogatives to effect change.
The conservative perspective also sits uneasily with same-sex marriage
proponents' form of advocacy. Reformers would not score points with
Burke and Oakeshott by relying on the argument that specific ideas or
abstract values must be given paramount effect in the design of social
institutions generally and marriage in particular. For Burke and Oakeshott,
unwavering commitment to ideas should never be allowed to carry the
day. The reluctance to push an abstraction to its logical conclusion grows
from and fuels a skepticism about demands for complete consistency in
the workings of real-world institutions. Any emphasis on chosen
principles as paramount, and any unwillingness to tolerate exceptions to
those principles in practice, exemplifies the rationalist project that Burke

52. for Burke, legal decisionmakers need not bow to popular sentiment, but must
make their own independent judgment about whether to make changes in law that are
necessary to alter the workings of existing institutions. See supra pp. 1070-71.
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and Oakeshott abhor. Other concerns must enter the picture and be
given great weight in the final calculus.
Three ideas repeatedly invoked by same-sex marriage proponents are
equality, nondiscrimination, and rights-specifically the rights to sexual
privacy and autonomy of action. These ideas are applied categorically
and admit of few exceptions. Perhaps the most important obj ection to
marriage as currently defined is that gay and straight persons and
couples are treated unequally. Confining marriage to a man and a
woman "discriminates" against men who wish to marry men, and
women who wish to marry women. This approach draws strength from
the observation that the categories recognized by marriage as currently
constituted-such as gender and sexual preference-are either immutable
or deeply ingrained and, thus, effectively beyond the individuals' control.
Using these categories to establish entitlements under law violates
fundamental principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness. It is wrong to
dole out entitlements based on accidents of birth, as these distinctions are
not likely to reflect any legitimate social purpose. This line of argument
effectively conscripts the apparatus developed under constitutional equal
protection jurisprudence as a limit on government action. This move in
tum draws on an elaborate body of liberal political theory that starts
from a presumption in favor of equal treatment and demands a reasoned
justification for departures. If an arrangement disfavors one group or
throws obstacles in its path, it is presumptively invalid absent a
demonstrable public purpose.
The arguments for same-sex marriage that are grounded in the primacy of
equality are intertwined with a call for respecting "fundamental" individual
rights to sexual privacy and autonomy. Although some rights are regarded
as absolute and inviolable, legal doctrine allows the presumption of
invalidity to be rebutted in some cases. But the reasons must be weighty
and principled. Those who plead the case for same sex marriage
demand a compelling justification for the claimed violation of equal
treatment and the compromise of the full exercise of sexual autonomy
that results. The reasons offered by opponents for differential treatment
in the realm of familial rights and relations are deemed too insubstantial,
speculative, and abstract to support such incursions.
Same-sex marriage proponents' approach to modifYing existing institutions
is clearly at odds with the conservative stance towards reform. In their
enthusiastic advocacy in the name of equality, rights, and sexual privacy,
reformers embrace a radical perfectionism that harbors no wariness or
hesitation in pursuing change. Change is unproblematic for those who
are committed to individualist values that elevate the achievement of
equality, the maintenance of sexual privacy and autonomy, and the
banishment of discrimination to pride of place in government or collective
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action. Oakeshott's "politics of felt need" is in full force here. 53 Analytic
tools are relentlessly put to work ferreting out all obstacles to perfect
equality and autonomy. The project is to identify every social practice that
disfavors some category of individuals-and is thus "discriminatory"--or
that stands in the way of exercising individual prerogatives-and thus
violates "rights." Whenever any institution fails fully to exemplify these
ideals, it is presumptively invalid and therefore must be altered or
abolished. Traditions that fall short of absolute vindication of core
ideals are harmful and unworthy of respect by definition. This method
necessarily gives little consideration to the potential long-term costs of
pursuing the stated objectives as aggressively as possible, as it
overwhelms those concerns with a potent counterweight. Because the
venerated ideals are salutary by definition, there is no reason to be wary
of changes that more perfectly achieve them.
There are additional arguments and advocacy methods same-sex
marriage proponents employ that Burke and Oakeshott would find
problematic. As already noted, both thinkers reject the notion, which
they regard as the hallmark of rationalism, that social practices, customs,
and institutions should be held to a standard of logical or ideological
coherence. Likewise, in deciding whether changes in traditional practices
are to be introduced, analytic rigor, logical consistency, and syllogistic
exactitude should never be paramount.
The contrast between
conservative pragmatism and the quest for logical rigor shows up in
three elements of the same-sex marriage debate: the question of the
centrality of reproduction in marriage; the significance of society's
acceptance of interracial marriage; and the use of the "slippery slope"
argument to predict an inexorable progression from gay marriage to
other unconventional, and presumably undesirable, marital relationships.
An essentialist argument repeatedly advanced by opponents of same-sex
marriage is that marriage's chief rationale is the production and nurturing of
children. Although recognizing that homosexual couples can raise children
together, opponents of same-sex marriage stress that homosexual
couples are by definition incapable of joint procreation and that
only heterosexual couples can produce shared biological children. The
power of biological ties means that heterosexual families are most likely
to achieve stability and successfully perform the childrearing function.

53.

See FRANCO, supra note 21, at 83-84; see also discussion supra p. 1072.
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If same-sex couples are allowed to marry, the institution will include
many more couples who fall short of the procreative ideal.54
Proponents of gay marriage respond by focusing on the logical
inconsistencies in this position. After all, some heterosexual couples are
sterile and some-such as the elderly-are allowed to marry even
though they cannot reproduce. The willingness to make exceptions for
heterosexual couples incapable of bearing children together shows that
joint procreation is not the "defining" essence of marriage.
Opponents of gay marriage respond that the belief "that procreation is
a primary purpose of marriage" does not entail an insistence "that only
people who can and will have children be allowed to marry.,,55 The
critical distinction is that "for heterosexuals, barrenness is the exception.
For homosexuals, it is the rule.,,56 This response rejects the syllogistic
fmID of the proponents' argument, which relies on the inexorable
progression from premise-non-reproducing heterosexuals are allowed
to marry-to conclusion-therefore non-reproducing homosexuals should
be, too. Traditionalists counter this close reasoning with the observation
that they seek to maintain a society in which heterosexual marriage is the
dominant and preferred choice. The benefit of the doubt should go to
long-standing and well-established methods for channeling people into
this most desirable form of behavior. The paramount method for this
channeling-and one with a venerable cultural and historical pedigree-is
the institution of heterosexual marriage. The belief is that the privileged
place accorded to heterosexual marriage in law and custom encourages
people to enter into this relationship and enhances the support provided
to those blessed with the ideal capacities.
The functions of encouragement, privilege, and support do not tum on
purely logical relationships. They are experiential and pragmatic, not
conceptual. Marriage's social role does not rest on any ironclad,
54. According to Maggie Gallagher, a leading critic of same sex marriage,
children need and deserve fathers as well as mothers. The public legal union
of a man and woman is designed first and foremost to protect the children that
their sexual union (and that type of sexual union alone) regularly produces. A
large body of social science evidence now confirms what the preferences for
marriage embedded in law (more strongly in the past than now) suggested:
children do better when raised by their own two married mothers and fathers.
Gallagher, supra note 1, at 782. See also RAUCH, supra note 1, at 114~22; Kay S.
Hymowitz, Gay Marriage vs. American Marriage, CITY J., Summer 2004, at 16, 16-24
(arguing that the problems faced by the many children of divorced parents~including
children in step-parent or "blended" families~demonstrate the value of heterosexual
marriage as an institution for rearing children); WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BROKEN
HEARTH (2001) (arguing that gay marriage will undermine the traditional nuclear family
unit).
55. BENNETT, supra note 54, at 133-34; RAUCH, supra note 1, at 115 (citing
same).
56. RAUCH, supra note 1, at 114.
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exceptionless demand that all couples actually achieve the optimum
arrangement. 57 Nor does the channeling function require the elimination
of all relationships that fall short of the ideal. After all, adhering to an
airtight rule would itself entail costs and intrusions. Such adherence
would fail to accommodate the untidy, unpredictable nature of male-female
relationships and the imperfect state of knowledge that prevents infallible
prediction about biological functioning. Finally, allowing homosexuals
as opposed to sterile heterosexuals to marry may have very different
real-world effects on the integrity of the institution-effects that
cannot be known until reforms are actually in place. The key is not
consistency for its own sake, but what actually works in practice to help
shape human choice and nurture the most desirable human relationships.
In this endeavor, reasoning only goes so far. For a conservative theorist,
disparaging the centrality of marriage's goal of promoting joint
biological reproduction based on pennitted exceptions exemplifies the
fallacious insistence on logical rigor rather than on how institutions
really work.
Another move in the debate favored by same-sex marriage proponents
is to compare the present legal exclusion of same-sex marriage to the
past bar on interracial marriage. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court invalidated the ban on interracial marriage as based on an
irrational animus against blacks and an unjustified revulsion against
"racial mixing. ,,58 As a fonn of pure prejudice that discriminates on the
basis of the arbitrary characteristic of race and that trenches on
fundamental rights, the ban is at odds with the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. 59
For same-sex marriage proponents, the analysis yields a strong parallel.
The exclusion of gays is likewise grounded in unreasoned and unreasonable
attitudes and revulsions. The rule lacks any rational justification and
fails to advance any legitimate social purpose. As a product of pure
animus or prejudice, it cannot stand. Although race is the quintessential
immutable characteristic whereas the status of sexual preference is more
ambiguous, this argument does not depend crucially on the immutability
element. Nonetheless, understanding homosexuality as having some
intrinsic, biological basis strengthens the analogy. If sexual preference
57. For a discussion of the traditionalist stance towards tolerating some deviance
from optimum rules, see infra pp. 1094-96.
58. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. Id. at 11-12.
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is in part biologically conditioned and, by extension, difficult or impossible
for individuals to control, the failure to accord equal treatment to those
endowed with same-sex desires will appear even more unjust. 60 A
related argument, grounded in the recognition of sex as a fixed attribute,
is that the ban on gay marriage is a form of sex discrimination.
Restricting the choice of a partner on the basis of sex is no different from
restricting the choice of a partner on the basis of race. Both distinctions
tum on immutable characteristics and trench on rights to be free from
invidious and arbitrary discrimination.
Although sex, race, or even sexual preference would appear analytically
to share attributes that would dictate similar treatment, conservatives
would not necessarily view these parallels as compelling. Interracial and
same-sex marriage seem conceptually similar for purposes of legal
analysis grounded in equality, rights, and the priority of anti-discrimination,
but these arrangements might operate very differently in the real world.
The roles that sex and race play in social life diverge in many respects.
There is simply no reason to believe that changing the rules of marriage
regarding sexuality will have the same practical impact as changing the
rules regarding race. Once again, what matters are not conceptual affinities,
but how same-sex and opposite sex relationships function, both individually
and in collective social life. The issues for traditionalists are down-toearth and pragmatic: whether recognition of same-sex marriage will end
up weakening or transforming the conventions surrounding the institution in
ways that have real consequences for real lives. Homosexual practices
regarding sexuality and familial relations may differ on average from
heterosexual practices. The speculation is that homosexuals may be
more likely to have multiple sexual partners, to tolerate sexual infidelity,
to be childless, or to view procreation as less central to the institution
than heterosexuals. 61 If homosexual couples' behavior diverges significantly
from the conventional roles established for husband and wife, this
behavior could influence how everyone thinks about marriage, with
significant consequences for expectations and conduct. That the nature
of this transformation might be difficult to predict or anticipate ahead of
60. The argument from a biological basis for homosexuality to the injustice of
banning gay marriage is far from airtight. First, that tastes and preferences are biologically
conditioned does not mean they are fixed or "immutable," in the sense of being wholly
resistant to willful modification. Second, even if desires are unruly, conduct based on
desires-including engaging in homosexual relationships-is a matter of choice and is
therefore amenable to meaningful control. See for example DEAN HAMER & PETER
COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF
BEHAVIOR (1994), and ROBERT ALAN BROOKEY, REINVENTING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL:
THE RHETORIC AND POWER OF THE GAY GENE (2002), for evidence and arguments about the
biological basis of homosexuality.
61. See discussion of these claims, infra, at pp. 1088-89 and notes 81-83.
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time does not mean it will not occur. Any such effects cannot be derived
by inference from a fixed set of premises or principles, but rather depend
on the realities of social psychology and social life.
Although the foregoing points depict advocates of same-sex marriage
as champions of conceptually abstract arguments of the type that Burke
and Oakeshott would regard with suspicion, logic-chopping is not the
exclusive purview of one side in the debate. Traditionalists warn that
sanctioning same-sex marriage will inevitably lead to the legalization of
other suspect forms of conduct, including polygamy, group marriage,
incest, and bestiality.62 If marriage must accommodate all preferences
on an equal basis, no variation, however repugnant, will be regarded as
off limits absent a palpable, manifest harm. Homosexual marriage lies
on a "slippery slope" that leads to other marital forms, it is argued,
because there is no analytically sound basis for distinguishing those
relationships under the principles that ground the recognition of same·
h'rps. 63
sex re IatlOns
Conservative thinkers should question this conclusion as giving too
much weight to abstract analysis. Just as permitting interracial unions
does not require that same sex marriage be legalized, a decision to
permit gay marriage does not entail a commitment to accept other forms,
if only because social practice often does not, and need not, yield to the
demands of consistency. Relationships that are potential candidates for
marital status will inevitably vary in their social and behavioral
implications and moral overtones, so each must be evaluated on its own
merits. First, the real-world costs of denying recognition to other fOlms
of marriage may differ from the costs of denying homosexuals the
ability to marry. A ban on marrying one's cat, for example, will have a
limited effect aside from frustrating a few strange persons' desires. On
the other hand, a ban on marrying a same-sex partner will have important
consequences for large numbers of people and for social life generally.
Second, the impact of granting the right to marry in other combinations
may also diverge significantly from the consequences of same-sex
recognition, and that impact will also depend on how many people take

62. See, e.g., Justice Scaiia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (waming that the logic of the Lawrence decision
threatened all marital restrictions "based on moral choices"). But see RAUCH, supra note
1, at 123-37 (analyzing and rejecting what Rauch calls the "anything goes" argument).
63. On the "slippery slope" argument, see John Corvino, Homosexuality and the
PIB Argument, 115 ETHICS 501, 501-34 (2005).
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advantage of the new marital fonn. Incestuous relationships are believed to
have disruptive effects on families and to pose a strong threat of
exploitation. Polygamy, if widely adopted, may alter the delicate ecology
of sexual allocation, unsettle family dynamics, and weaken the position
of women. 64 Third, there may be little actual demand for other forms of
marriage. As Jonathan Rauch points out, there is no movement to speak
of for the legalization of incest and no plausible prospect that it will be
accepted anytime soon. 65 Finally, there is no reason to believe that the
slippery slope will have much purchase in the political arena as a
general matter. Ordinary voters will not necessarily give much weight to
conceptual consistency and adherence to principle. Realizing that
seemingly like cases are really not alike, voters may remain unmoved
by the notion that sanctioning one extension of the category of marriage
necessarily requires giving in to all conceivable reforms. All these
factors potentially undermine the force of the slippery slope argument.
On the other hand, the argument is not necessarily invalid. Pennitting
one new fonn of marriage may in practice ease the way for another or
may strike many people as a reason to pennit other novel fonns. The
point is that this cannot be detennined a priori. Rather, it is a matter of
how the changes play out. It's not possible to know what will happen
until it actually occurs.
The discourse surrounding same-sex marriage also reveals patterns in
the political uses of justification and evidence that conservatives would
find problematic. Burke and Oakeshott repeatedly object to rationalist
demands that existing institutions justify themselves at the bar of
reason. 66 Those demands are evident in a modern progressivism that
views all settled arrangements with skepticism unless proof is forthcoming
of their superiority to proposed alternatives. Although conservatives
often speak the language of traditional values in defending long-standing
rules to one another, that parlance does not carry the day with reformers
who grant no presumption in favor of established mores. Pointing to
those who sacrifice in the name of the status quo, reformers maintain
that proposed changes will vindicate fairness, equality, freedom, and
other desirable values. These claims place the onus on traditionalists to
demonstrate that reform is undesirable and that current practices serve
compelling social objectives. Mere speculation about potential future
hanns and vague allusions to collective wisdom about "human nature"
fail to satisfy. Those who suffer under existing arrangements call upon
conservatives to present empirical evidence to support the predictions of
64.
65.
66.
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See RAUCH, supra note 1, at 126-27 (discussing drawbacks of polygamy).
Id.at131-32.
See, e.g., FRANCO, supra note 21, at 83; KIRK, supra note 17, at 33-34.
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harmful effects. Data and statistical analyses become the weapons of
choice and social science the battleground on which the participants in
the culture wars engage across party lines.
This is a war that conservatives are destined to lose. Rationalists call
for objective, empirical justification for traditions that fall short of
perfectly exemplifying core ideals. This demand places conservative
positions at a severe disadvantage because it sets an exacting standard
that is virtually impossible to meet. Albert O. Hirschman has suggested
that conservative arguments are of three types: that change will not work
(the Futility Thesis), that it will backfire (the Perversity Thesis), or that it
will threaten the valuable functioning of sound institutions (the Jeopardy
Thesis).67 Accordingly, conservative voices are frequently heard to assert
that proposed refonns will fail to advance claimed beneficial objectives,
will generate effects opposite to those intended, or will produce harmful
results. These arguments are necessarily predictive. The consequences of
unprecedented shifts in law, custom, or practice have, by definition, not
yet been realized. To satisfY social science standards, conservatives must
come forward with data that systematically compares the effects of
established arrangements with innovations they resist. In most cases,
this circle cannot be squared. The data either do not yet exist or are
radically inconclusive. 68
67. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
68. Examples of paucity and questionable quality of data regarding the effects of
same sex marriage can be found in Stanley Kurtz's analysis of same-sex marriage in the
1 etherlands and in Scandinavia. See Kurtz, Going Dutch?, supra note 7, at 26-29.
Kurtz claims to show a correlation between the advent of same-sex marriage and higher
out-of-wedlock birthrates in the Netherlands, but argues from correlation to causation
without effectively controlling for other influences. See Stanley Kurtz, The End of
Marriage in Scandinavia: The 'Conservative Case' for Same-Sex Marriage Collapses,
THE WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 2,2004, at 26, for a similar study involving Scandinavia.
In the case of gay adoption, sociologist Judith Stacey has stated that "[t]he debate among
scientists is all about how good the studies [regarding the effects of growing up with gay
parents] we have really are." Benedict Carey, Experts Dispute Bush On Gay-Adoption
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at A16. A recent survey of 44 adolescents raised by
lesbian parents by psychologists at the universities of Virginia and Arizona, reported in
the Carey article, revealed no significant differences between the children and children
not raised by lesbian parents. In contrast, a meta-study that collates work on children
raised by homosexuals noted that the data on the effects of being raised by gay parents is
"scant and underanalyzed," with some appearing to suggest that the children of gay
parents "will be more likely to attain a similar orientation ...." One of the authors of
the study commented, however, that "you can't base an argument for justice on
information that's empirically falsifiable in the long run." Susan Dominus, Growing Up
With Mom and Mom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 24, 2004, at 68, 74. For an overview of the
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The requirement to produce rational or "scientific" justification in the
political arena also ensures that remote and collective effects get little
weight. Effects that are cumulative over time are especially hard to
demonstrate. 69 Information on the ramifications of social change is
likely to concern short term shifts and to focus piecemeal on outcomes
that are easy to isolate and measure objectively. This necessarily slights
normative changes in mores and practice, which tend to play out over
the long term and to interact with a complex host of factors. 7o Those
factors are internal and external, psychological and material. As these
complexities are not easily measured, canvassed, or described using
conventional tools of social science, the dynamics of social norms are
poorly understood and elusive. Indeed, the study of social norms is just
getting started, and it is unclear how far it will advance in the future. 7'
The difficulties of developing theories and accumulating data about
normative shifts and behavioral trends, in combination with the
relatively long timeline for many important social developments,
translates into a chronic shortfall in the ability to demonstrate how
reforms conservatives resist produce detrimental outcomes.
Moreover, gathering the requisite comparative data carries its own
intolerable costs. Infonnation can only be obtained by engaging in the

controversy surrounding the effects of gay parenting, compare Lynn D. Wardle, The
Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 833
(1997) (claiming to find evidence of adverse effects) with Carlos A. Ball & Janice
Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian
Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 253 (1998) (claiming that Wardle systematically
misconstrues the evidence on which he relies). For discussion of a related issue, see
infra note 44 (reviewing the controversy surrounding evidence of gay male promiscuity).
69. See Yannis M. Ionnides & Linda Datcher Loury, Job Information Networks,
Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality, 42 J. ECON. Ln. 1056 (2004) (documenting
unpredictable and often counterintuitive effects on employment prospects of small
differences in group networking patterns and conventions), for a recent example of an
attempt to describe complex dynamics of normative interactions in the employment
realm.
70. For a discussion of the conservative perspective on social nOlms, see infra pp.
1089-97.
71. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607 (2000) (exploring the interaction of norms and
law); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic ofReciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law (Yale
Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 31, Yale Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 281, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=361400; Richard H.
McAdams, Conventions and Norms: Philosophical Aspects, 4 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL AND BEHAV. SCI. 2735 (Neil 1. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001)
(discussing dynamics of social norms and conventions); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (using
social norms to develop explanations of behavior and to predict the effects of legal
rules). See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2002), for a more general introduction to the dynamics of
norms.
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very social experiments conservatives seek to forestall. Because many
longstanding norms or practices are difficult to reinstate once breached,
the very structure of the method for generating proof threatens to
undermine traditionalist priorities. Yet rationalists are unmoved by these
concerns. Vague premonitions of erosion or unraveling are deemed an
inadequate basis for resisting changes that satisfy immediate needs and
urgent desires. The imperative to respond to these priorities puts
traditionalists everywhere on the defensive and effectively reverses their
cherished presumption that existing institutions, and not their
transformation, deserve the benefit of the doubt.
The controversy surrounding single-sex marriage is but one example
of how this dynamic plays out to the detriment of a traditionalist agenda.
Another example can be found in the effort to change the single-sex
status of the Virginia Military Institute. The challenge to VMI's policy
of excluding women succeeded in part because the school's defenders
were unable to demonstrate that the so-called "adversative" method of
education used at the school-in which students were routinely exposed
to harsh conditions, demands, penalties, and hazing by more senior
students-was superior to alternatives. 72 Nor was the school able to
muster persuasive proof that the preservation of the method depended on
the school's all-male character.?3 Although those issues were aired in
the court briefs, with the parties referring to social science studies about
various aspects of single-sex education, the submissions contained a
paucity of data on the key questions at issue: whether the adversative
method actually produced beneficial outcomes and whether the presence
of women would be subversive of the method's integrity and
74
The defenders of the status quo were ultimately forced
effectiveness.
72. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540--41 (1996).
73. ld. at 545--46.
74. An exchange in oral argument between Theodore Olson, the United States
Solicitor General, and Justice Breyer, is particularly revealing on these points.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-53 , United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941 & 04-2107),1996 WL 16020:
MR. OLSON: The evidence is overwhelming that that system would not exist
in the company of[women].
QUESTION: Well, maybe it wouldn't. ... [B]ut my question is, what is it
that's so important about this really hard to grasp adversative thing
that .... enables you to say to a young woman I'm very sorry, even
though you want to go there and you want this result, you can't?
MR. OLSON: The answer-the experts testified, and people who are
professiQnal educators, who have spent their life in education, saying that the
system could not exist. It would fundamentally have to be changed.
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to rely on a small number of "experts" who invoked their long experience,
rather than any hard supporting data, to opine that the adversative
method had proven its worth in turning unruly and directionless boys
into disciplined and effective men. 75 Likewise, in support of the
prediction that women would denature the adversative method, experts
pointed to women's relative physical weakness, their psychology, and
their tendency to excite men's erotic interest and protective impulses.
These factors, it was argued, made women inherently unsuited to, and
destined to alter, the adversative environment. A skeptical Court found
none of these arguments persuasive, and VMI was ordered to admit
'
76
women or go out 0 fb usmess.
Another debate that has been raging for decades with no definitive
resolution concerns the connection between federal welfare programs
and rising out-of-wedlock birth rates among the poor. Although
common sense would suggest that providing money to single-parent
families is a potent incentive to form such families, conservatives have
struggled without much success to find data to support that conclusion. 77
Family disintegration is almost surely the product of a multi-pronged
assault on conventional strictures and understandings from many quarters,
with factors like the availability of birth control, changes in divorce
laws, feminism, the sexual revolution, and the courts' recognition of
children's and parental rights outside of marriage playing some role. 78
QUESTION: I take that as a given. What I'm asking is, what's so important
about that particular rat line, et cetera?
MR. OLSON: BecauseQUESTION: You could have the same-are you getting my point?
MR. OLSON: Yes. The answer is that it works, Justice Breyer, in a single sex
environment for young men. Now, given the opportunity to design something
exactly identical to that, the people who spent their life in education designing
a system for young women, and the Government experts really don't disagree
with that, say we know what would work, we would know what would attract
sufficient numbers of peopleQUESTION: And even a woman who says, I understand that, but for me, she
says, for me, I think it would work better at VMI, and it may be true as to her,
irrespective of the majority, mightn't it?
75. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540-44.
76. Id. at 557-58.
77. See, e.g., Charles Munay, Family Forrnation, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE
(Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001); Robert Moffit, Incentive Effects ofthe u.s.
Welfare System: A Review, 30 1. ECON. LIT. 1-61 (1992). See generally Ira Ellman, Why
Making Family Law is Hard, 35 ARIz. ST. L.1. 699 (discussing causes of changes in
marriage and divorce rates).
78. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECO D REVOLUTION IN
FAMIL Y LA W 123-29 (2000) (discussing factors leading to changes in family structure);
see also George A. Akerlof et aI., An Analysis of Out-af-Wedlock Childbearing in the
United States, III Q. 1. OF ECON. 277-317 (1996) (proposing an economic model of the
effects of the technological "shock" of the birth control pill on sexual, marital, and
childbearing behavior).
.
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Even if welfare programs contribute, the noise-to-signal ratio may be too
high to allow separate factors to be teased out. Social science has simply
proved inadequate to the complexities of this issue, and has failed to
provide a definitive answer.
A related controversy-on the effects of single-parent families on
children's well-being-has generated clearer data, but only after
decades of social experimentation. The story of the controversy
surrounding out-of-wedlock childbearing, however, illustrates the point
that knowledge often comes too late. There is a necessary lag between
the instigation of a social change and the generation of persuasive
evidence on its ultimate effects. Even if traditionalist priorities are eventually
vindicated, it is hard to put that knowledge to good use because the
shifts at issue have taken on a life of their own and are resistant to
"rational" correction in the light of scientific insights. Although
social science evidence continues to mount that single motherhood
and divorce have detrimental effects on children's well-being
independent of education, income, and other factors amenable to
correction through public policy,79 there is little indication that many
people are significantly influenced by the emerging wisdom or that
existing trends will be arrested or reversed. so In any event, the story of
single-parenthood illustrates how arduous is the task of assessing the
effects of social innovation even after long experience. Social science
methodology is necessarily clUde, and generating the requisite data is
arduous and expensive. Demonstrating group differences or temporal

79. See CARBONE, supra note 78, at 111-22 (summarizing evidence of the negative
effects on children of growing up in single-parent or stepparent families). See also SARA
McLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WI-IAT HURTS,
WHAT HELPS 38 (1994); Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are
Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607-27 (2004)
(discussing how patterns of fertility, employment, and marriage, which differ
dramatically by social class, have contributed to social inequality by fostering a
divergence in the well-being of children at the bottom and top of the socioeconomic
scale).
80. The much touted decline in teen and single-parent births masks a stabilization
at much higher rates of single parenthood and much lower man-iage rates than prevailed
fifty years ago. Specifically, the ratio of children born to single parents versus two
parents is dramatically higher and continues to climb. See Charles Mun-ay, Does
Welfare Bring More Babies?, 115 THE PUB. INT. 17 (1994) (discussing con-elation
between welfare and childbirth rates); see also Charles Munay, The Coming White
Underclass, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14 (discussing significance of out-of-wed10ck
birthrate), for a discussion of different ways of interpreting data on maniage and sing1eparenthood.
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changes requires large samples and complex statistical analyses, which
leave plenty of leeway for arguments over methodology. Studies differ
widely in the magnitude and nature of demonstrated effects, with some
showing only modest impact. Because studies necessarily focus on a few
easily measured outcomes, they tend to slight subtle variations in
experience and functioning and fail to capture the full spectrum of family
structure effects.
Dissection and simplification are the unavoidable
methodologies of choice-whether from ideology, from the limitations
of the chosen instruments, or from some mixture of the two.
Related issues regarding sexual behavior and psychology have emerged
in the debate sUlTounding same-sex malTiage, with their resolution
plagued by similar difficulties. Traditionalists worry that same-sex
malTiage is destined to destabilize the institution across the board by
undermining the conventions of sexual fidelity and exclusivity that are
essential to its cohesion. The claim is that homosexuals are more likely to
have multiple sexual partners and to tolerate an "open relationship" with
their partners. 8 ! Although this speculation comports with commonsense
observations concerning male homosexual practices and existing evidence
of males' preference for sexual variety,82 hard data comparing heterosexual
and homosexual patterns are nonetheless hard to come by. Existing studies
are rare, use small samples, or do not clearly address the differences
between homosexual and heterosexual conduct. 83
In any event, unpacking the traditionalist argument based on disparities in
sexual proclivity and practice yields a number of premises that resist
empirical verification. The argument assumes that the "contagion" from
81. Compare RAUCH, supra note 1, at 141-45 (rejecting the "myth of gay-malt
promiscuity"), with Lynn D. Wardle, Image, Analysis, and the Nature of Relationships
in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE, supra note 4, at 115-16 (citing studies
in support of the contention that "the reality of multiple paI1ners, promiscuity, and lack
of sexual fidelity in homosexual relationships is beyond serious dispute today"). Eugene
Volokh, on his webblog, Volokh Conspiracy, has posted the results of his survey and
analysis of existing studies on gay male promiscuity. See Posting of Eugene Volokh,
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.comJ (May 16,2003, 09:40 PST); see also Posting of
Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.comJ (May 22, 2003, 13:54 PST).
According to Volokh, the most reliable data show that, while gay men have more varied
sexual experiences than straight men, the differences are not as dramatic as opponents of
gay marriage suggest. According to his SUillillaIY, gay and bisexual men on average
have 26.6 sexual partners after the age of 18, while straight men have 16.9. The median
number of lifetime paI1ners is 10 for gay men and 6 for straight men.
82. See DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING (rev. ed. 2003) (discussing male sexual habits and greater desire for sexual
variety).
83. In his survey of studies of gay male sexual behaviors, supra note 81, Eugene
Volokh notes that most studies in this area are "junk science" and none are entirely
reliable. Even the most methodologically sound study, EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL.,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
315 (1994), is not free from significant flaws.
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homosexual practice to heterosexual nonns cannot easily be contained.
This, in tum, rests on accepting that only a single expectation or norm
regarding sexual fidelity in marriage is likely to prevail. Finally, the
traditionalist position draws strength from the possibility that heterosexual
relationships may be more vulnerable than homosexual unions to
disruption through infidelity. Whether this is so depends on men, women,
or both, feeling more threatened by an opposite sex-as opposed to a
same sex-partner's adulterous behavior. Those who resist these
propositions absent factual suppOli are unlikely to be persuaded. To the
extent that conservative thinkers such as Burke and Oakeshott are
skeptical of the unrelenting demand for hard evidence to support all
grounds for preserving existing institutions, they are more likely to
credit these speculations.
Yet another way in which supporters of same-sex marriage arguably
diverge from thinkers like Burke and Oakeshott is in their attitudes
towards cultural norms, including those embodied in customary practices
and established institutions. The conservative stance towards same-sex
marriage grows directly from a conception that assigns traditional
institutions a crucial role in the regulation of moral life. On the
conservative view, moral codes exist to curb conduct that is harmful to
others and to the group. Because individual and group priorities do not
always align, morality pits individual self-interest against the collective.
Under this conception, critical self-determination in the realm of moral
choice, which rational individualists tend to favor, is a fOlmula for
disaster. Individuals cannot be trusted to chart their own course in areas
governed by traditional morality, for two reasons. First, the mistrust of
moral improvisation proceeds from the recognition of limitations in
human understanding. Individuals are simply not equipped to divine
what is best for society as a whole, to canvass all concerns, or to predict
the consequence of deviating from well-established rules. Second,
conservatives acknowledge the infirmities of human will. Even if
individuals could systematically take account of all considerations that
infonn moral precepts, they are unlikely to follow the wisest course.
Since morality often requires self-sacrifice, assigning individuals the
task of figuring out how best to navigate their own social life unguided
by strong normative structures poses too high a risk of self-serving
choices. Adherence to established codes-including those governing
human sexuality, family life, and procreation-is necessary to insure
that appropriate sacrifices are made to safeguard the well-being of others
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and preserve the social order. In sum, because self-prescribed judgments
in matters of morality are likely to go wrong, deference to traditional
moral codes is in order despite apparent harshness or irrationality in
individual cases.
Traditional institutions, and the role prescribed for individuals within
them, are a practical response to the dual infirmities in human intellect
and will that make moral codes necessary. Because most people are
incapable of reasoning through every dilemma of social life on their
own, they depend on off-the-shelf scripts that define basic duties and
provide transparent guidelines for behavior in commonplace social
situations. Simple, unyielding rules maximize the chance that persons of
limited intellect and self-control will negotiate complex human interactions
successfully. As such, these scripts should be as clear and unequivocal
as possible. Formal institutions such as marriage, by embodying a simple
and transparent set of expectations, help facilitate moral conduct by
ordinary people. Marriage, and the conventional nuclear family that
results, define the duties of good husband, wife, parent, child, or sibling.
By marrying, a person implicitly accepts these aspirational roles and
pledges to live up to them. The very rigidity of these duties resists selfregarding manipulation. Individuals who faithfully fulfill them minimize
the risk of behaving destructively. The enabling function of such welldefined institutional roles goes along with a moral psychology that sees
practical guidance as more important than the critical faculties.
Adherence to duty is not primarily a matter of reason and does not rest
chiefly on analysis. Rather, compliance is best learned by example and
through the development of habits in thought and action. Experience
and observation are the most effective teachers. The family itself is the
principal locus of moral education.
This conception of moral psychology regards the health, stability, and
integrity of basic institutions as essential to a civilized existence. Changes
in those institutions are met with wariness because they engender
moral confusion. If good conduct consists of fulfilling established
duties, modifying those duties in unpredictable ways may undermine
their authority, generate errors in judgment, and lead to harmful
choices. By posing the challenge of unprecedented situations, radical
innovation in family arrangements potentially compromises the clarity
of social prescription by disrupting stereotyped expectations and upsetting
well-established forms of interaction. On this view, the introduction of
same-sex marriage threatens to diminish marriage's effectiveness as a
moral heuristic.
The conservative resistance to novelty cannot be derived from first
principles. Rather it rests on the experiential perception that most human
beings are incapable of figuring out how to behave and must rely on
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strong, well-established, external paradigms. On this approach, clarity,
transparency, stability, and simplicity are of utmost importance. The
maintenance of authority is also critical: if an institution is too
changeable or too amenable to modification to satisfy the perceived
needs and desires of the moment, its status as an aspirational ideal risks
being undermined. Because disruptions threaten moral efficacy, analytic
and reasoned critiques that engender the demand for change are viewed
as potentially subversive.
Accepting a heuristic role for marriage in fosteling moral improvement
would seem to argue in favor of extending marriage to same-sex couples.
If participating in the institution engenders heterosexual couples' beneficial
conduct-by making them, for example, more responsible, other-directed,
dutiful, hard-working, prudent, and conscientious-why would it not do
the same for homosexuals as well? The previous exposition suggests
that matters are not so simple. The disruptive effects of moral innovation,
and the confusion such novelty generates, must be balanced against the
behavioral benefits that extending marriage might confer. Moreover, the
predicted benefits might not be forthcoming. Marriage may not exert as
salutary an influence on homosexuals as heterosexuals because the
institution might prove less effective in "settling" the former than the
latter. The concern is that gays are more likely to dilute marriage than
marriage to strengthen gay commitments, for at least two reasons. First,
gay couples will never share biological children, and many will have no
children at all. Allowing same-sex marriage may hasten the shift of
marriage towards a non-procreative norm, which conservatives fear will
be less stable. Second, marriage will require gays to abjure the freewheeling sexuality to which some members of their community have
long been committed. The worry is that, instead of uncritically accepting
the strictures of heterosexual marital fidelity, too many gay couples may
choose to accommodate the sexual variety they enjoyed prior to
legalization.
The conservative understanding of the key role played by established
institutions in regulating moral conduct goes along with a broader
conception of the centrality of norms, mores, customary practices, and
cultural traditions in social life. The dynamics of these elements fit well
with the pragmatic, organic picture favored by conservatives, who regard
them as central to organized existence and critical to the regulation of
behavior. These fOlms fit less well with a rationalist-materialist, "scientific"
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outlook, which regards them with unease or even suspicion to the point of
sometimes denying their reality.
Those who think culture matters are partial to a view of human
motivation, choice, personality, and moral life that makes "enlightened"
intellectuals uneasy. The rich picture of human motivation embraced
by conservative traditionalists like Oakeshott and Burke necessarily
resists systematic description. These thinkers challenge a materialist
view that sees persons as "rational actors" who are motivated by selfinterest and who operate through reasoned calculation. Rather, they
observe that people are often moved by values, emotions, ideologies,
moral expectations, and group identity, and sometimes take decisions
that appear self-defeating, unpredictable, and at odds with rational
deliberation.
As already suggested, the slighting of traditional normative practices
is partly fueled by frustration with their methodological intransigence. 84
The functioning of norms and the influence of cultural factors in social
life are poorly understood and elusive, and resist precise dissection,
analysis, quantification, and unifying theories. Although social science
has not ignored norms entirely and has made some attempt to describe
their dynamics using concepts such as "contagion" or "tipping," the state
of the work is primitive. 85 In general, social science has proved
inadequate to a full understanding of how cultural factors fit into social
life or how traditional institutions motivate and shape behavior. Indeed,
cultural phenomena are so complex that they often elude comprehension
using currently available instruments and methods of social science.
The methodological infirmities of social science and its inability to
achieve a comprehensive understanding of the roots of human action
vindicate the central Burkean theme: that rational, human capacities are
inadequate to the task of accounting for the vagaries of social life.
Limitations on understanding and descriptive power necessarily translate
into restricted ability to manipulate complex behaviors and to design
effective policy interventions. These shortcomings are an affront to the
rationalist worldview. Not surprisingly, proponents of a scientific outlook
resist these conclusions and are loathe to recognize that their instruments
may fail to capture the messy realities of social life. The response is to
slight the elements that elude understanding by discounting them in
favor of a more objective and materialist description. These biases in
84.
85.

See discussion supra pp. 1082-85.
See, e.g., THOMAS SCHELLING, MrCROMOTlVES AND MACROBEHA VI OR (1978)

(showing ways in which small changes in behavior can precipitate dramatic shifts in
aggregate patterns and practices); GLADWELL, supra note 71 (building on Schelling's
work to argue that ideas and social practices often spread quickly and pervasively, like
outbreaks of infectious disease).

1092

[VOL. 42: 1059, 2005]

The Conservative's Dilemma
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the social scientific outlook, coupled with the demand for empirical,
systematic, "scientific" justification for traditionalist claims, necessarily
disfavor conservative priorities.
The methodological limitations of the social scientific worldview fuel
the especially partial and impoverished outlook on sexuality that currently
dominates legal analysis. The enlightened case for gay marriage is
grounded largely in a narrow discourse of rights, needs, and individual
desires. In personal and collective life, sex functions primarily as a
realm of individual expression and self-actualization. Sexuality and
procreation belong to a private arena upon which society should not
trench, and institutions are valued principally for advancing individual
interests. 86 Because sexuality, sexual choice, and sexual practices have
come to be regarded as rights that function to trump other social
priorities, absolutism tends to dominate the discourse. Not only should sex
remain as free as possible from legal or even informal public regulation,
but any rules must not discriminate in the allocation of benefits and
burdens. All individuals have an equal claim to regard in this area.
Fairness requires claims of sexual autonomy to be enforced with
rigorous attention to neutrality and even-handedness.
To the extent that principles of morality govern conduct that harms
others, this freedom-of-sexuality view is at pains to drain sexuality of
moral implications. The reluctance to balance sexual prerogatives against
the social effects of sexual conduct-which are often powerful-is
reflected in the tendency to slight or ignore hanns that may result from
the free pursuit of personal inclinations. These effects are either ignored
outright or minimized by casting doubt on asserted connections through
the familiar demands, described above, for objective, empirical evidence
of harm.
The individualistic discourse of rights that surrounds sexuality is in
tension with an outlook that takes nonnative dynamics seriously. As noted,
conservatives are attuned to the crucial role of conventions-including
the customary fonns surrounding established institutions-in promoting
moral conduct and maintaining the proper functioning of social life.
Anything that subverts traditional expectations is the proper subject of
public and private concern. That social norms often serve to restrain
86. As Maggie Gallagher puts it: "Here is one view: Marriage is an essentially
private, intimate, emotional relationship created by two people for their own personal
reasons to enhance their own personal well-being. Marriage is created by the couple, for
the couple." Gallagher, supra note 1, at 775.
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self-regarding, irresponsible behavior renders them fragile and vulnerable
even to remote and obscure effects. Because cultural practices are
maintained through group consent, confonnity is crucial to their vitality,
and deviant conduct poses a potential threat to their very integrity.
For those who reject this view of nonnative regulation, the notion that
individuals should be expected to sacrifice their perceived interests and
hearts' desires to help shore up traditional institutions seems at best a
case of muddled thinking and at worst a fonnula for tyranny. It seems
bizarre that the health of conventional couples' marriages somehow
depends on gay persons being prevented from jointly adopting children,
declaring bankruptcy, buying homes as tenants in the entirety, inheriting
without probate, or making medical decisions for their partners-all
under the socially sanctioned banner of matrimony. The asserted
connections are especially suspect given the absence of a well-developed
theory of how social nonns work and how seemingly independent
choices exert remote effects on unrelated individuals. By definition,
these dynamics are hard to demonstrate to skeptics' satisfaction. In the
absence of manifest interconnection, the traditionalist folk wisdom that
non-confonning conduct constitutes a threat to beneficial institutions and
social practices fails to persuade.
Giving pride of place to the role of social nonns in regulating conduct
is also at odds with the adherence to analytic consistency-the hallmark
of a legalistic emphasis on equality and individual rights. Social nonns
are a fonn of practice rather than a theoretical construct. Their role is to
guide the pragmatic accommodation to messy experience in which
multiple priorities must be balanced and human judgment applied to
unique or unprecedented situations. Nonns are highly functional and resist
absolutist abstractions. They do not always confonn to the strictures of
syllogistic nicety, exceptionless adherence to principle, internal consistency,
"fairness," or the imperative that like cases be treated alike. They are
untidy, imprecise, and ad hoc.
The contrast between a rationalist, intellectualized, perfectionist view
of behavior and a more traditional outlook that assigns a key role to
social nonns is revealed in ways of dealing with deviancy. Although
conservatives typically embrace clear, unequivocal standards of conduct,
their perspective on enforcement is more nuanced. An extreme and
unyielding stance towards non-confonnity suffers from an absolutism at
odds with conservative pragmatism. The force and integrity of rules are
not viewed as requiring that those rules never be broken. Rather, in
many cases their usefulness requires only that they be followed by most
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people most of the time. 87 Therefore, traditional societies often stop short of
seeking the complete elimination of nonconforming behavior, with
custom dictating an informal spectrum of responses from tolerance to
outright sanction against those who fall short of normative expectations.
A graduated response, conditioned by specific circumstances, allows
society to accommodate some degree of deviance, which serves as a
safety valve, acknowledges human frailty, makes room for eccentricity
and imperfection, and recognizes that too much uniformity itself
compromises important values. But this stance is not at odds with clear
standards. On the contrary, traditional societies know that deviant
behavior cannot be permitted to infect and undennine core social norms
and values. It is crucial to the integrity of norms that non-confonnity be
vigilantly marginalized, cabined, and penalized in ways mild or severe. 88
Maintaining clarity and behavioral standards means that in no case can
deviance be equated with best practice. Nonconforming lifestyles must
not be accorded the approval and privileges reserved for more favored
forms.
This approach entails creating a declension or pecking order among
social practices that judges some better than others and valorizes some to
the detriment of others. Such a hierarchy fits uneasily with a moral
absolutism that can accommodate only polar responses. Unless a practice is
demonstrably harmful, discrimination of any kind is unjustified. If
harmful, it must be banished entirely. Any conduct not bad enough to
eradicate completely warrants a categorical permission that admits of no
exceptions, extends uniformly to everyone, and must apply on the terms
enjoyed by all pennitted altematives. 89 This all-or-nothing approach is
87. See, e.g., discussion supra pp. 1078 (arguing that the centrality of cobiological
parenting as a rationale for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not require
that infertile heterosexual couples be excluded). See also Gallagher, supra note 1, at 789
(arguing that the "restrictions and suppOlis at the heaIi of marriage law are not absolute,"
and that the "public purposes of marriage law" do not necessarily require the imposition
of punitive sanction for all nonconfolming behavior).
88. Patrick Devlin, for example, recognizes that the complete elimination of
practices that violate social rules may sometimes be unnecessary or even inadvisable.
"We may feel about [celiain conduct] that, if confined, it is tolerable, but that ifit spread
it might be gravely injurious; it is in this way that most societies look upon fornication,
seeing it as a natural weakness which must be kept within bounds but which cannot be
rooted out." PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 17 (2d ed. 1968).
89. An important contemporary conservative commentator, Theodore Dalrymple,
recently took note of a similar argument in a different context. See Theodore Dalrymple,
Ibsen and His Discontents, CITY J., Summer 2005, at 79, 87 ("This is an argument
typical of people who wish to abolish boundaries: if those boundaries are not-because
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fundamentally at odds with the conservative recognition that habits that
are relatively inconsequential if kept on the periphery of social life can
seriously threaten the social order if celebrated or allowed to become too
commonplace. This traditionalist understanding is wary of one-size-fits
all and sees value in preserving distinctions between tolerance and
privilege, studied disregard and affirmation, and ostracism and legal
penalty. Although these gradations are notoriously hard to justify in theory,
what counts far more for conservatives is how they actually work in
practice. What is important is their effectiveness in channeling conduct
and preserving institutions that, however imperfectly, help maintain a
viable social order.
Jonathan Rauch's characterization of the practices surrounding adultery
provides an illustrative example. Adultery takes place against a backdrop of
a strong expectation of marital sexual fidelity that continues to hold sway
in our society. Rauch's discussion of adultery makes reference to "hidden
law," which he describes as "the norms, conventions, implicit bargains,
and folk wisdom that organize social expectations, regulate everyday
behavior, and manage interpersonal conflicts.,,9o He claims that hidden
law largely governs the social response to violations of the lUle of
marital fidelity.91 Secrecy, hypocrisy, double standards, and lack of
candor are essential elements in the delicate social ecology that
maintains monogamous sex as the norm for heterosexual marriage.
Discreet adultery is often ignored, but open and flagrant conduct is more
severely sanctioned. 92 Transgressions receive a graduated response,
with society at large looking the other way until families and spouses
signal the appropriate reaction based on their own perceived interests.
Rauch claims that these practices work to preserve the core expectation
of marital exclusivity while at the same time recognizing the facts of
human frailty, the realities of longstanding marital relationships, and the
complexities of desire. 93 They also function, most importantly, to
protect and empower the most vulnerable players, including spouses and
children. 94

they cannot be-adhered to with perfect consistency, then they should be obliterated, as
they can only give rise to hypocrisy.").
90. Jonathan Rauch, Conventional Wisdom: Rediscovering the Social Norms that
Stand Between Law and Libertinism, 31 REASON 37, 37 (2000).
91. ld.
92. Jonathan Rauch, Live and Let Lie, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Sept. 22, 1997, at 25-26.
93. ld. at 26.
94. ld. See also Jonah Goldberg, Hidden Law and Open Adultery, NAT'L REv. ONLINE,
July 16, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldbergprint071601.html (arguing
that there is no inconsistency in society studiously disregarding discreet adulterers while also
sanctioning those who misbehave notoriously or who are unlucky enough to get caught).
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These conventions cannot be derived from or explained by a few basic
precepts. The practices do not confOlm to absolutist and categorical rules
such as "lying is always wrong," "conduct should be equally condemned
regardless of whether or not one gets caught," "if some transgressors are
punished, all must be," or "everyone must receive the same penalties."
Rather, the hidden law continuously balances personal freedom and
pursuit of happiness against social well-being and institutional integrity,
all in light of individual circumstances, with no one consideration
gaining absolute primacy and no single principle triumphing over all.
Although imperfect, these complex guidelines work to balance multiple
priorities while minimizing social harm. They simultaneously maintain
the integrity of core expectations that serve vital social purposes.
IV.

SHOULD CONSERVATIVES RESIST SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?

Where does the forgoing leave us in our quest to understand the
political resistance to marital reform and to assess the cogency of this
position? We can speculate that those who voted against the recognition
of same-sex marriage reject the inexorable logic of equality, rights, equal
access, non-discrimination, and the demand for absolutely principled
consistency. These opponents have signaled their refusal to lump into one
undifferentiated mass the spectrum of sexual, familial, and procreative
forms or to regard all options as equivalent in social effects and
significance. Likewise, their outlook appears hostile to the leveling of
degrees of social approval and disapproval and is skeptical of according
all lifestyles exactly the same treatment in law and social life. On the
other hand, it is unlikely that voters who reject gay marriage are
completely immune to rationalist methods and principles. The institutional
imperatives of modem democratic societies and the need to find common
ground among diverse constituencies push participants to develop
reasoned justifications and to look for evidence to support their position
whenever possible. As Hegel noted in Philosophy of Right, the
"unwilling[ness] to acknowledge in attitudes anything which has not been
justified by thought" is "the characteristic property of the modem age.,,95
Ordinary voters, steeped in that modem age, cannot altogether avoid
thinking critically about their opposition to marital reform.
95. FRANCO, supra note 21, at 86-87, (quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 22 (Allen Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991)).
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Although reasoned justification, grounded in empiricism, is certainly
part of the political equation, the outcomes on same-sex marriage ballot
initiatives strongly suggest that reasoned justification is not the whole of
it. Many intellectuals take for granted the importance of a search for a
"self-consistent creed" or for evidence that would stand the test of
scientific standards, but those imperatives may not have the same hold
over ordinary people. Although there is surely overlap in the arguments
that influence intellectuals and voters, that overlap is not perfect because
members of these groups do not share the same stance towards faith,
tradition, custom, and social mores. For many ordinary citizens, not
everything is open to question and not all institutions demand the same
form of support or justification. Thus, Paul Franco, in commenting critically
on Oakeshott's views, overstates the case when he asserts that "the
valorization of habit, custom, and the unselfconsciousness of tradition is
profoundly anachronistic. This may be the way politics were conducted
in aristocratic societies, but it is irrelevant to modem democratic
societies." 96 The politics of same-sex marriage directly challenges this
view. Habit, custom, tradition, and settled understandings are far from
irrelevant in most lives, and those who would work a radical change in
marriage must confront their hold even in the present age.
These observations do not settle the question of how conservatives should
or would vote on same-sex marriage. As noted, although Burke and
Oakeshott are wary of change, neither believes that reform is always to be
opposed. 97 Not all change is change for the worse. Nonetheless, general
precepts such as giving the status quo the benefit of the doubt and
eschewing rationalism do not get us very far in resolving particular
questions. We may have to concede that the conservative understanding of
social life will not always determine whether a specific refonn should be
adopted. Burke's and Oakeshott's sometimes obscure pronouncements may
not tell us what we should do when confronted with a burning issue of the
day.98 In the end, neither thinker leaves us with a clear roadmap for reform,
nor do their writings generate a checklist of specific criteria for classifYing
changes as good or bad.
As political actors, we are still left with the challenge of how to decide
which aspects of specific institutions should be changed or preserved
and how fast the pace of change should be. Jonathan Rauch has
taken up that challenge by attempting in a recent book to extrapolate
conservatives ideas and apply a traditionalist framework to argue in
supra note 21, at 96.
See supra p. 1072.
98. See Herzog, supra note 32, at 340 ("[I]n any actual moral or political dispute,
the [Burkean traditionalist] has no extra resources, no trump card up his sleeve that can
be triumphantly brandished at the moment when his opponents are stymied.").
96.

97.
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favor of same-sex marriage. Rauch's analysis makes common cause
with those who honor traditionalist forms. Unlike many proponents of
same-sex marriage, Rauch does not start with skepticism about the
institution. Rather, he accepts the centrality and social importance
of marriage as traditionally constituted and views the preservation
of heterosexual marriage and the nuclear family as vital priorities. 99
From this starting point, Rauch argues that offering-rather than
denying-same-sex couples the option of getting married is more
likely to preserve marriage, to increase its importance, and to
strengthen its role as the most important form of sexual commitment
in our society. 100 He notes in this vein that making marriage
available to homosexuals supports the withdrawal of privileges and
recognition now accorded in some circumstances to domestic
partnerships, or "marriage lite," because maintaining those privileges for
same-sex couples despite the availability of marriage will operate as
discrimination against heterosexuals, who do not have-because they
never needed-the option of domestic partnerships. 101
But if
homosexuals can marry, they do not need domestic partnerships either. In
that case, however, maniage can once again be made the sole route-for
everyone-to the privileges previously associated with that institution.
That move, he argues, is likely to strengthen marriage rather than weaken
it. '02 One aspect of Rauch's prediction has recently been borne out:
employers in Massachusetts-the one state to recognize same-sex
marriage-have pushed to repeal the requirement that they provide
·
103
bene fiIts to same-sex domestlc partners.
Rauch nonetheless admits that a scenario at odds with his positive
predictions-one more consistent with homosexuals weakening some of
marriage's central understandings rather than with marriage making
homosexuals' behavior more conventional-cannot be categorically
ruled out. The traditionalists' concerns with stability, sexual fidelity-in
service of stability and for its own sake-and the marital unit as a
protected space for childrearing, are not entirely put to rest. Rauch
99. See RAUCH, supra note 1, at 7.
100. See id. at 86-103. But see supra p. 1080 (reviewing reasons for conservative
concerns that extending marriage to gays will destabilize, rather than shore up,
marriage).
101. RAUCH, supra note 1, at 6.
102. Id. at 86-103.
103. Kimberly Blanton, Unmarried Gay Couples Lose Health Benefits, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 8,2004, at AI.
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implicitly acknowledges that arguments about how this reform will
affect the future of marriage are necessarily speculative and are thus
unlikely to bridge the entire divide between advocates and opponents of
same-sex relationships.
Is there some way to improve on Rauch's conservative case for marriage
by placing less stress on prediction and more on present developments?
In their discussions of proposed changes in social practice, Oakeshott
and Burke seem to place great weight on how much change has already
transpired. 104 Legislators, lawmakers, or ordinary citizens, in deciding
whether to vote for a shift in law or policy, should ideally be able to
point to some seismic transition that has already taken place. Minor or
marginal modifications will not do. Rather, there must be an overwhelming
urgency, which is best established by identifying how evolution on many
fronts has made the remnants of past practice awkward, unworkable, or
even self-defeating. Enough change must have occurred to make the
proposed reform compelling or even unavoidable.
It can be argued that same-sex marriage does not clearly meet this
standard. The picture is decidedly mixed. Attitudes towards homosexuality
have liberalized and practices surrounding marriage have evolved
significantly. On the other hand, those changes are partial, embattled,
and resisted by large numbers of people. That referenda seeking to bar
same-sex marriage have passed by wide margins all over the country
suggests that gay marriage does not represent the capstone of a
revolution that is irresistible or virtually complete. This is not a case of
a few grey-haired relics holding out for the past. Many people see no
urgency whatsoever in making this change and are functioning just fine
without it.
It is thus far from clear whether the conservative prerequisite for
change-clear, widespread, and urgent need-is even satisfied for gay
malTiage or will be any time soon. But even if the groundswell were
sufficient, that would not resolve the matter. Majority sentiment is, for
Burke and Oakeshott, only one factor in the mix. As Burke puts it, a
politician must determine whether "the inclinations of the majority ...
concur[] with [his] own sense of the intolerable nature of the abuse.,,105
And beyond the uncertainty generated by looking to existing moral
attitudes and practices regarding homosexuality, a broader methodological
issue is at stake. There is something circular about relying on the very
existence of current beliefs and practices as a guide to whether they
104. For Oakeshott's comments on women's suffrage, see OAKESHOTT, supra note
20, at 57 ("[T]he only cogent reason to be advanced for the technical 'enfranchisement'
of women was that in all or most other important respects they had already been
enfranchised.").
105. See supra note 35.
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deserve our encouragement and approval or whether we should vote to
advance or extend them. How should we then determine if a present
tum is decadent or errant? As conservatives would arguably want to
reserve the possibility of forestalling or reversing current developments,
they should hold on to the idea that it is sometimes appropriate to resist
what is popular. What marriage has become may not be what we
want it to be or what it needs to be. Touting same-sex marriage as an
accommodation to reality leaves us unsatisfied because it crowds out
normative judgment and the possibility that most people may behave
badly or abandon sound practices. Our suspicion is that changes in
morals cannot, in themselves, justify moral change.
Clearly we need to look to something more than popular sentiment for
a way out of the thicket. Although evolution in moral practice or belief
is not entirely irrelevant, developments of a different type may offer a
more secure and unproblematic foundation for embracing reform. One
way to break the logjam is to move away from bootstrapping off
prevailing mores and focus more on objective factors. We should look
for social changes that alter not so much the meaning of institutions and
traditions as their practical utility and real-world function. Material,
measurable, comprehensive, and non-ideological secular shifts are what
we are seeking. The more far-reaching and palpable the transformations
proposed reforms are designed to accommodate, the stronger the foundation
for change.
Another of Rauch's arguments offers promise in this department.
Rauch maintains that the centrality of procreation, with maniage seen
primarily as a crucible for nurturing the next generation, should yield to
a model of marriage as facilitating and encouraging mutual adult
caretaking. Acceptance of that model, he argues, points strongly in favor
of the adoption of same-sex marriage. Homosexuals require and desire
mutual caretaking as much as heterosexuals, and reinforcing the
commitments that foster such caretaking is good for society as a whole.
These benefits do not depend on the sexuality of participants.
This argument acquires special force when considered in light of
recent objective, material, and demographic changes. The last 150 years
have been witness to unprecedented modifications in the terms of
existence worldwide, but especially in the developed and developing
world. Perhaps most profound are dramatic improvements in health and
life expectancy, which have led to a sharp growth in population and
accelerated urbanization. As a result, the world is now overcrowded,
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with space and resources in demand. The rise of a technological,
"knowledge" economy (which depends on high quality human capital),
combined with longer lifespans and lower infant mortality (which
enhance the payoff to investments in human capital), encourages the
shift from large families to more intensive cultivation and education of
fewer children. These developments also make children more expensive
to bear, raise, and educate. Because producing large numbers of
children no longer makes economic sense, the birth rate has fallen
worldwide. As a consequence, a smaller percentage of the human-and
especially the female-lifespan is devoted to bearing, raising, and
nurturing the next generation. Childrearing is no longer a project to fill a
woman's entire life or to preoccupy couples for all but a fraction of their
lives together. The lengthening of the lifespan, however, has meant that
a larger fraction of many lives is spent in old age. Because age produces
a decline in health and physical vigor, elderly persons often require care
and assistance from others. The family and marriage are the institutions
that have best provided such care.
These developments have radically transformed family life, with
corresponding drastic changes in the interaction of the sexes and the
lives ofwomen. 106 That transformation has not been uniform, with some
individuals holding out by adhering to patterns more in keeping with the
demands of the past. But those holdouts ride the crest of a secular,
demographic trend of increasing longevity and falling birthrates-a
trend that has engulfed western and non-western societies alike and has
made early marriage and large families increasingly uncommon. The
dynamic of smaller families and longer lifespans has greatly increased
the number of elderly persons, including many who require a prolonged
period of support and care.
The emerging pattern is one of greater diversity of styles of life, with
fewer relationships or marital units devoting themselves to procreation
primarily, and many of those only for a short and concentrated period.
At least in the first world, the numbers reflect that procreation and
childrearing have become a niche lifestyle rather than the gold standard
for responsible adult existence. I07 At the same time, the plethora of
106. See for example PETER G. PETERSON, GRAY DAWN: How THE COMING AGE
WAVE WILL TRANSFORM AMERICA AND THE WORLD (1999); PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE
EMPTY CRADLE: How FALLING BIRTHRATES THREATEN WORLD PROSPERITY AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT (2004); BEN J. WATTENBERG, THE BIRTH DEARTH (1987); BEN J.
WATTENBERG, FEWER: How THE NEW DEMOGRAPHY OF DEPOPULATION WILL SHAPE OUR
FUTURE (2004); Stanley Kurtz, Demographics and the Culture War, POL'y REV., Feb.-Mar.
2005, at 33, for a SUll1malY and review of the demographic developments and effects on
family life.
107. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., The New Red-Diaper Babies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2004 (discussing the "new natalism" that divides red, high marriage-and-birth
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elderly persons creates the challenge of how society will care for those at
the end of life.
The facts of demography and the march of history have unavoidably
rendered procreation less central to adult existence and more peripheral
to many lives. At the same time, mutual adult caretaking has become an
important function of families and human partnership. That these
developments have occuned cannot be denied. Nonetheless, there is still
room to differ over their precise significance and import for institutional
change. It can be argued that procreation, although much diminished in
volume and duration, remains vital to human and cultural continuity.
Thus the need to accommodate demographic reality must be balanced
against the potential to jeopardize the well-being of children and
families-or to worsen the beleaguered position they now occupy from
recent upheavals. But those fears must be tempered by considerations
that loom large as a matter of fact. If it is not to lose its dominant position,
marriage must-and inevitably will-accommodate the increasing number
of individuals who eschew childbearing altogether or have long moved
far beyond it-a group that includes many homosexuals. It will adopt
itself to the present reality of a nation that is rapidly aging. Whether the
fonn of maniage that results will be a weaker one, and one that less well
serves the still vital role of providing for future generations, may not be
a question that can presently be answered. As Jonathan Rauch aptly
notes, our cunent ploy of preserving maniage in its traditional forms
while also creating a menu of alternatives, such as domestic partnerships, to
solve the problem of unmet need, is one that could backfire and arguably
already has. lOS "Maniage-lite" threatens to weaken maniage itself by
making it inelevant to many lives. Thus in choosing among alternative
responses to present conditions, conservatives are thrown back on their
old dilemma of having to risk destroying an institution in order to save
it. Unfortunately, their emphasis on experience as the best guide to
action is the very source of uncertainty and risk that sunounds the
choice. A definitive answer, for now, remains elusive.

rate states from blue, low birthrate states).
108. See RAUCH, supra note 1, at 86-103.
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